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Abstract 
Under devolution, state and local governments are expected to use the greater 
authority granted to them to design new and innovative programs that are tailored to local 
needs. Existing research on the devolution of welfare programs has reported substantial 
variation in the policies adopted by states in the wake of welfare reform. However, under 
second-order devolution, local governments also gained discretion over welfare services. 
Some have argued that, while devolution should increase flexibility, local governments face 
constraints that limit their functional discretion. Using California as an example, I assess 
whether there is variation in the service priorities adopted by local governments and whether 
these priorities translate to frontline practices. I show differences in the service priorities of 
local governments; however, these priorities are not associated with differences in 
sanctioning or time limit exemptions. Thus, while local governments may formally adopt 
different priorities, state and federal policy choices, as well as client characteristics, may 
restrict priorities from translating into differences in caseworker behavior. 
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Introduction 
There is a longstanding debate in the United States about the best way to divide 
responsibilities between national and subnational governments. This debate is especially 
pronounced about the level of government that should have authority over redistributive 
programs serving poor people (Donahue, 1997; Nativel, Sunley & Martin, 2002). Proponents 
use multiple justifications to support devolving service provision to subnational governments, 
including making services more efficient and better aligning the costs and benefits of 
providing services (Kincaid, 1998). Most importantly for the current study, supporters of 
devolution assert that, when free from federal constraints, states will have the ability to 
engage in experimentation and innovation that will lead to better service provision through 
the increased ability to tailor services to local client needs (Shipan & Volden, 2012).  
The merits of devolution were a core part of the justification for the passage of the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act in the United States in 
1996, commonly called “welfare reform.” Through its replacement of the Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) with the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
program (TANF), welfare reform sought to fundamentally change the nature of the cash 
assistance program serving poor families. Under AFDC, it was argued that overbearing 
federal regulations led to a heavily bureaucratic eligibility-compliance model of service 
provision in which case managers were primarily focused on rule enforcement and accuracy 
(Bane & Ellwood, 1994). By handing authority over to states to design and implement their 
own programs, proponents of devolution argued that states would be able to design and 
implement programs that could focus on moving recipients off welfare rolls and into paid 
employment. Overall, welfare reform has been cited as a “vivid example of authority 
cascading to lower levels of government” (Donahue, 1997, p. 7), making the policy a strong 
candidate for understanding the effects of devolution and decentralization. 
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 Although lawmakers passed welfare reform with the intent of giving substantial 
policy authority to state governments, researchers have pointed out that discretion on the 
books does not always translate into actual functional discretion (Sosin, 2012). First, Peterson 
and Rom (1990) have argued that, regardless of client needs, states may limit the generosity 
of welfare provision to avoid acting as “welfare magnets” and pulling recipients from 
surrounding jurisdictions. Second, some have argued that, for a variety of reasons, the actions 
of state actors will be still be limited by national government priorities. Importantly, states 
still must incorporate key components of welfare reform into their programs, including 
focusing on employment rather than human capital development; the imposition of financial 
penalties for noncompliance (called sanctions); and instituting time limits on cash assistance. 
Additionally, Sosin (2012) asserts that in times of crisis, state lawmakers may mimic the way 
that problems and solutions are framed by federal agencies in order to increase the perceived 
legitimacy and political support for their programs. Third, organizational scholars have 
asserted that for devolution to lead to changes in service provision, frontline workers must 
change their behavior to implement policies in the ways envisioned by lawmakers (Brodkin, 
1997). Yet, studies of the AFDC program repeatedly documented a clear disjuncture between 
policy intentions and actual frontline practices (Brodkin, 1997; Handler & Hasenfeld, 2007; 
Meyers, Glaser & Mac Donald, 1998).  
To date, there has been considerable research examining state policies, which show that 
TANF policies vary considerably from state to state (DeJong et al., 2006; McKernan, 
Bernstein & Fender, 2005); however, there is also evidence that state policy choices have 
been limited by the work promotion focus of federal welfare reform legislation (Handler & 
Hasenfeld, 2007; Mettler, 2000; Meyers et al., 2001; Soss et al., 2011a). While important, 
this research does not adequately account for the fact that welfare reform also resulted in 
some state lawmakers passing substantial discretion over welfare programs to local 
Constraints on local welfare discretion 
 
 
5 
governments or regional governing boards in a process called second-order devolution 
(Gainsborough, 2003). Thus, there is an important gap in our knowledge about the effects of 
devolution on service provision after welfare reform (Kim & Fording, 2010; Kelleher & 
Yackee, 2004; Sheely, 2013). 
To address this gap, the current study addresses two research questions using data from 
California, a state in which local governments have significant discretion to design and 
implement their own versions of TANF. First, in an era of devolution and decentralization, is 
there variation in the service priorities adopted by local governments? Following the example 
of Sosin (2012), service priorities are conceived of as the way in which service programs 
view clients and their problems. These service priorities also reflect how programs 
understand the best ways to ameliorate their problems (Hasenfeld, 2010). Second, given the 
multiple constraints imposed by federal and state regulations, are these service priorities 
translated into different practices at the street level? To answer these questions, I use a novel 
approach that links textual data from county plans outlining service priorities crafted just 
after the passage of welfare reform with administrative data on welfare recipients, and 
secondary data on the economic and political characteristics of California counties. 
Study findings support the idea that, under a devolved welfare system, counties adopted 
a variety of service priorities. In addition to the work promotion message of federal welfare 
policy, California counties also stressed goals such as changing welfare departments to make 
them more responsive to client needs, protecting children, and working with the community 
to improve job availability and placement. However, these service priorities are not 
significantly associated with differences in frontline workers use of sanctions or time limit 
exemptions. Thus, while there is variation in local service priorities, this study finds that 
frontline behaviors are mostly in line with state and federal policy provisions.  
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Background 
 
Second-order devolution and variation in service priorities 
One of the key justifications used to support the devolution of services is that state and 
local governments have a better understanding than the federal government of the problems 
and demands of the clients within their states. By granting them more discretion, state and 
local actors will be able to create more appropriate services for recipients, which should 
improve the efficiency of welfare services (Kim & Fording, 2010). If this justification is true, 
we would expect to see variation in the approaches taken by different localities to providing 
welfare services for poor mothers, who are the primary recipients of TANF. Additionally, the 
service priorities should be shaped both by the needs of clients themselves, as well as the 
local economic and political conditions (Hasenfeld, 2010). Soon after the passage of welfare 
reform, researchers investigated both of these claims. 
To assess variation in local service provision, one strand of researchers conducted in-
depth case studies of local welfare offices. These studies conclude that there are differences 
in the service priorities adopted by local offices in the wake of welfare reform. For example, 
local agencies varied in terms of whether the primary goal of their program was to either 
promote employment or reduce dependency on welfare (Lurie & Riccucci, 2003; Gais et al., 
2001; Gardiner et al., 2007). Within these broad goals, offices also adopted different service 
priorities outlining the best way to meet their core goals. For example, local agencies in 
Michigan, while all focused on the goal of promoting employment, adopted four different 
service priorities that stressed whether the primary responsibility of services should be 
helping clients engage in job search activities; pro-actively placing clients into jobs; placing 
clients in jobs and offering them additional support if they do not quickly obtain 
employment; or providing minimal supports and relying on clients to find employment 
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(Anderson & Seefeldt, 2003). In another example, after gathering observations of local 
offices from 15 states, Gais and colleagues (2001) created a taxonomy of TANF programs 
organized around the primary service priorities of programs and the means used to meet these 
priorities. They assert that TANF programs seek to meet the primary goals of work 
promotion or reduced dependency by promoting one of three activities—motivating clients, 
building their skills, or reducing barriers. 
While these research studies document variation in the service approaches adopted by 
local welfare departments, all of the authors stated that local office provision was 
fundamentally shaped by the priorities set by state lawmakers. For example, Gardiner and 
colleagues (2007) assert that local service priorities are crafted to meet state performance 
requirements, to align with the goals described by state policy statements and 
communications, and reflect state-provided training programs for staff. Thus, these studies 
support the idea that devolution may lead to variation in program priorities; however, they are 
also constrained. 
 
Second-order devolution and the importance of local context 
Proponents of devolution also argued that devolution would improve efficiency by 
allowing programs to be tailored to local economic and political characteristics. A second 
strand of research sought to address this claim by examining how economic, political, and 
demographic factors shape variation in the local implementation of TANF in the form of 
caseworker use of sanctions. These studies show that caseworkers are more likely to impose 
sanctions in counties that are more politically conservative (Fording et al., 2007; Keiser et al., 
2004). While sanctioning rates are related to local politics, they are not consistently related to 
economic conditions. For example, a study assessing whether sanctioning rates in California 
counties are influenced by changes in local economic and political factors finds that 
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sanctioning rates between 2000 and 2010 increased along with wages in the retail and service 
sector (Sheely, 2013). However, in the same study sanction rates are largely insensitive to 
other economic factors, as well as changes in the political environment. A study by Kim and 
Fording (2010) compared sanctioning rates between counties in states that engaged in 
second-order devolution and those in states where welfare administration remained 
centralized. They find that sanctioning rates are higher in devolved welfare system, which 
may either support the idea that localities are restricting welfare services to avoid being too 
generous or that they are imposing more sanctions to control costs. 
In an important mixed methods study exploring sanctioning patterns among Florida 
regions, Soss and colleagues (2011b) explicitly trace how state policy decisions related to 
performance requirements are filtered through the local political economy, the implementing 
organizations, and the workers implementing the policies. At the state level, the authors detail 
the stringent performance management rules adopted by the state of Florida in which the 
performance of regions are monitored and ranked with the goal of improving the overall 
effectiveness of the system. Using local level administrative data, they show that poor 
performance ranking leads to different sanctioning patterns, depending on the local political 
economy. Specifically, poor performance rankings translate into increased sanctioning in 
politically conservative counties, especially for clients who are African American and poorly 
educated. By conducting interviews with case managers, the authors find that case managers 
do not simply choose to sanction more clients when their county performs poorly. Indeed, 
caseworkers across counties expressed ambivalence about the effectiveness and fairness of 
sanctions. However, in Florida, case managers were not given other tools to use when faced 
with noncompliant clients. Thus, in an environment where they are expected to meet 
performance goals yet have few resources to do so, case managers see sanctions as the sole 
means they have to elicit client compliance. Thus, in this study, we see that the actions of 
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frontline workers are shaped by local conditions. Supporting the case study research above, 
the study also affirms that these actions are also driven by state-level policies and priorities. 
 
Current study 
To date, the literature examining the effects of second-order devolution has largely 
focused on documenting variation in local service priorities or on the extent to which 
sanction rates are shaped by local political and economic conditions. Both of these strands of 
literature suggest that variation may be constrained by the actions and priorities of state 
governments. However, at this time, there are few studies that bring these strands together to 
test whether differences in service priorities at the local level translate into frontline practices. 
This is important since one of the primary assumptions of second-order devolution is that 
increased program authority will lead to meaningful differences in local program 
implementation. If local service priorities change in response to devolution, but frontline 
practices are instead influenced by state policy decisions and regulations, then the promise of 
second-order devolution will be incomplete. 
 
Empirical Approach 
The current study examines welfare provision in California counties in order to address 
two research questions: 1) What are the service priorities adopted by local governments in 
the wake of welfare reform? 2) Given the multiple constraints imposed by federal and state 
regulations and policy priorities, are these service priorities translated into different practices 
at the street level? 
In this section, I describe California’s TANF program, CalWORKs, and outline the 
reasons why California offers a unique context to address the research questions. Next, I 
explain the empirical approach taken to address each of the research questions. For the first 
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research question, I assess service priorities using a textual analysis, combined with a Latent 
Class Analysis (LCA). For the second question linking service priorities to frontline 
practices, I use hierarchical linear modeling. 
 
Study setting: California 
In August 1997, California created its own TANF program, CalWORKs. The 
CalWORKs program was built upon its predecessor under AFDC, the Greater Avenues to 
Independence program (GAIN). GAIN was designed to move recipients into work; however, 
the first step of the program was completing an assessment of recipient skills. If they were 
found to lack basic English or other skills, recipients were enrolled in up to two years of 
education and training. It was only on completing education and training, and after three 
months of unsuccessful job search, that recipients were enrolled in workfare. Thus under the 
GAIN program, there was a dual emphasis on moving recipients to work, as well as 
providing education and training (Zellman et al., 1999). The GAIN program also granted 
counties substantial discretion. An evaluation conducted by RAND found that county 
discretion under the GAIN program, “led to a range of program strategies, from adopting 
education first approaches to pushing work first ones” (Zellman et al., 1999, p. 16). 
The CalWORKs program was, in at least two ways, a continuation of the GAIN 
program. First, while the legislation increased work requirements of recipients, and thus 
followed the “work-first” approach of federal welfare reform, the state description of 
CalWORKs did not make it “work-only” (Klerman et al., 2001). Thus, state legislation 
required the provision of extensive services for clients experiencing work barriers, as well as 
providing funding for these services. As a result, compared to welfare programs enacted by 
other states, the work requirements of CalWORKs were generous. Following federal 
requirements, CalWORKs required that recipients engage in work activities for at least 32 
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hours per week. However, to meet the remaining work requirements, recipients could 
participate in education and training activities, as well as in substance abuse, mental health, 
and domestic violence services. Additionally, state lawmakers exempted a number of 
populations from work-requirements, including recipients who have a disability for more 
than 30 days, are under 16 years old, under 19 years old and in school full-time, over 60 years 
old, or caring for a child who is a ward of the state (Reed & Karpilow, 2010).  
Compared to other states, CalWORKs is also generous in its time limit and sanction 
policies. In reference to time limits, California chose to accept the 60-month lifetime limit on 
aid proposed by the federal government, rather than adopting a shorter time limit. 
Additionally, California was one of only four states that chose to use state funds to continue 
to provide financial support to children after their parents “timed out” of the program (Rowe, 
2000). The CalWORKs legislation provides more extensions and exemptions required by 
federal law for specific recipients, including those who are either disabled or caring for a 
disabled family member, those who are sanctioned, victims of domestic abuse and those who 
are over 60 years old (Crow & Anderson, 2006). Turning to sanctions, California adopted a 
partial sanction policy, which means that only the adult portion of the benefit is terminated 
for noncompliance. In order to protect clients with work-related barriers, the sanctioning 
procedure in California is also quite detailed and includes multiple points at which a client 
can show “good cause for noncompliance” (Bagdasaryan, 2005).  
The second way that CalWORKs built on the GAIN program was through granting 
substantial authority for program design to its 58 county governments. Paralleling the funding 
arrangement between the federal and state governments, the California state government 
gives counties a “single allocation” or block grant to fund their employment services, child 
care, and administrative costs. Counties have discretion about how to use these funds. For 
example, counties decide the participation exemption length for new mothers and the 
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welfare-to-work activities that will count toward work requirements. The state also imposes 
performance goals on counties. If California is penalized for not meeting federal work 
participation requirements, counties that do not meet the standards must share half of the 
penalty with the state.  
The substantial discretion given to counties is reflected in the legislative process 
following the passage of CalWORKs. According to Zelman et al. (1999), the state legislation 
was written in a way that substantially increased county discretion to design and implement 
their own versions of the CalWORKs program. Under this legislation, each county was 
responsible for creating a plan outlining the vision of its own CalWORKs program. Although 
counties only had four months to develop these plans, the process was quite collaborative and 
involved community meetings, as well as coordinated efforts between county lawmakers and 
welfare administrators. In the counties studied by Zelman et al. (1999, p. 34), welfare 
directors asserted that they used the process of developing the county plans as an opportunity 
to describe and create “the kinds of services they believed would really help recipients make 
the transition to work and independence and/or to deliver these services in a manner that had 
not been possible before CalWORKs.”  
While the state provided a template for counties to follow in drafting their plans, the 
state welfare department made it clear that the state would only “certify” rather than 
“approve” the plans submitted. This meant that as long as counties met basic requirements 
and did not propose anything that contradicted California state law, their plan would be 
certified. The process of certifying county plans was supposed to act as a signal of the 
counties’ “unprecedented local flexibility” (Zellman et al., 1999, 30). Indeed, the passage of 
CalWORKs marked a change in the relationship between the state welfare administration and 
local governments. Klerman et al. (2001, 66) state that after the passage of CalWORKs, state 
administrators learned to respond to county implementation questions by stressing county 
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discretion to make choices rather than providing ‘guidance’ or issuing ‘clarifications.’ An 
implementation study of CalWORKs conducted two-years after its passage suggests that 
differences in service priorities did translate into program differences, although many 
counties stayed close to the work-first approach of the state-level legislation (Klerman et al., 
2001).  
California is an ideal setting for this study for three reasons. First, as mentioned above, 
California has given broad authority to county governments to design and administer their 
own welfare programs (Gainsborough, 2003). Second, data show that there is substantial 
variation in sanctioning rates and other outcomes among California counties (Bagdasaryan, 
2005; Klerman et al., 2002; Sheely, 2013). Third, understanding welfare provision in 
California has national significance because the state is home to nearly 30 percent of all 
welfare families in the United States (United States Department of Health and Human 
Services, 2012).  
 
Textual analysis of county welfare plans 
 A two-step process is used in order to assess the types of service priorities adopted by 
California counties. First, I conduct a textual analysis of the county welfare plans described 
above that were created after CalWORKs was passed. Following the method outlined by 
Mohr and Guerra-Pearson (2010), textual codes are created from county plans related to (a) 
the population targeted by the policy; (b) the problem that needs to be addressed; and, (c) the 
appropriate means of addressing the problems. To improve the likelihood that the creation of 
codes was unbiased (Padgett, 2008), codes were created in consultation with an expert in 
welfare administration. In addition, the author and another researcher with expertise in 
welfare reform, independently coded fifteen of the 58 county plans. Rather than to formally 
measure inter-rater reliability, the purpose of this independent coding was to ensure that 
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important concepts were not being missed and that plans were being consistently coded 
(Lietz & Zayas, 2010). These codes are then transformed into dichotomous variables by 
assigning counties a score of “1” if its plan includes the code or a score of “0” if the code is 
not present in the plan.  
In the second step, I use latent class analysis (LCA) to group counties into service 
priority groups, based on the codes generated above (Nylund, Asparouhov, and Muthen 
2007). To assess the groups created by LCA, models are evaluated based on statistical 
outcomes (called model fit statistics) and the usefulness of the model. Model fit statistics 
include the Akaike information criterion (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), the 
Lo-Mendell-Rubin test, and probability statistics. This method also produces item-response 
probabilities, which yields the probability of an observed response for each variable based on 
class membership. Although researchers use these statistics when determining the number 
and composition of classes, the final selection of the model is also based on its substantive 
merits and interpretability (Collins and Lanza 2010). Other studies have used similar methods 
to create homogenous groups from the program goals and service strategies adopted by 
health-care service organizations (Garrow & Grusky, 2014) and large public organizations 
(Davis & Stazyk, 2015). 
The outcome of this analysis is a description of the service priorities of counties in 
1997. It is entirely plausible that these service priorities have changed over time due to 
changes in the policy environment (such as with the passage of the Deficit Reduction Act in 
2005), due to changes in economic conditions, as well as changes in priorities based on 
organizational learning after seeking to implement welfare services. However, since counties 
only created these plans once, it is not possible to test these assertions.  
 
Relationship between service priorities and outcomes: Hierarchical linear modeling 
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To assess whether service priorities are linked to frontline processes, I estimate a 
multilevel logit model predicting the likelihood of an individual welfare client being 
sanctioned or receiving an exemption from time limits as a function of individual and county 
characteristics, including the county service priorities identified above. The multilevel 
approach is used because the data are structured so that welfare clients (level 1) are nested 
within counties (level 2). In comparison to models that include county dummy variables or 
use standard errors that are clustered by county, I chose a multilevel modeling approach since 
it allows me to explicitly assess the amount of variation in outcomes that can be attributed to 
the counties in which recipients reside (Bryan & Jenkins, 2015). The final model presented 
below is a random intercept model (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). All continuous variables 
included in the model are grand mean centered and models also include year fixed effects to 
control for any time-dependent variables that are not explicitly included in the analysis. 
 
Data 
Data for this study come from multiple sources, as presented in Table 1. Individual-
level data on welfare recipients come from micro sample data from the US Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS) that was collected from 2000 until 2005.1 To create 
these data, states report information on a sample of TANF families from a given month. 
DHHS then aggregates these monthly data submission onto fiscal year files; I converted the 
data into calendar year to correspond with the other data used in the analysis. The sample 
reported in the data must be representative of the state, but not the characteristics of 
recipients from all counties. Thus, it is possible that smaller counties may not be included in 
the report in any given year. For this reason, I combined data for multiple reporting years. I 
chose the year 2000 as the beginning of the time period to give program goals ample time to 
                                                
1 Data are available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/ftp/hsp/tanf-data/index.shtml. 
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translate into differences in outcomes. The DHHS data include information on multiple 
people in the household, including the head of household, biological and stepchildren, 
grandparents, and other related people. To ensure that the individual selected was eligible for 
sanctioning, receiving TANF, and related to an eligible child, only the heads of households 
were included in the sample.2  
<< Insert Table 1 here >> 
 
Dependent variables 
I examine two dependent variables in this analysis: whether or not a recipient had any 
sort of benefit reduction (sanctioned) or received an exemption from federal time limits. For 
sanctioning, a dichotomous variable was created in which all households with sanctions were 
coded as “1” (i.e. sanction amount was greater than 0) and “0” if the sanction amount was 
listed as 0. The data also include information about whether the current month of assistance 
was exempted from the 60 month time limit; clients were assigned a code of “1” if they were 
exempt.  
 
Key independent variables: Service priorities 
Service priorities are the key independent variables in the analysis. As described above, 
these variables are identified through a textual analysis of county welfare plans, combined 
with an LCA to identify groups of counties with distinct service priorities. Since these plans 
were only submitted once, they are a time-invariant measure. The results of this analysis and 
a fuller description of these variables are reported in the results section.  
 
                                                
2 I did not include cases funded by Separate State Programs or Maintenance of Effort 
programs as some of the outcomes of interest were only available for TANF-funded cases.  
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Individual-level control variables 
Based on the literature documenting that sanctioned recipients are more likely to have 
personal characteristics, human capital deficits, and other personal or family challenges that 
make them less able to succeed in the labor market than non-sanctioned recipients (Cherlin et 
al., 2001; Hasenfeld et al., 2004; Pavetti et al., 2004), several individual-level control 
variables are included. Data for these variables come from the DHHS data files. These 
variables are clients’ race/ethnicity and the number of children in the household. 
As described above, state CalWORKs legislation specifically exempted some 
vulnerable groups from sanctions and time limits. I also include client characteristics related 
to these requirements, including age, receipt of disability income for either the recipient or a 
family member, and having less than a high school diploma or GED.  
 
County-level control variables 
I include a set of control variables used in prior research related to county sanctioning 
rates and state welfare policies, including the unemployment rate (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; 
Gais & Weaver, 2002; Sheely, 2013) and the party affiliation of registered voters (Fording et 
al., 2007; Keiser et al., 2004; Sheely, 2013). To assess economic conditions, a variable 
measuring the percentage of county residents who were unemployed from 2000 until 2005 is 
included. A yearly average of unemployment is created using monthly data from the 
California Economic Development Department. The local political environment is assessed 
by using data from the California Secretary of State to determine the percentage of voters 
who were registered as Republicans in elections that took place between 2000 and 2005. 
Given research suggesting that local racial/ethnic composition may be a primary determinant 
of sanctioning patterns (Keiser et al., 2004; Soss et al., 2011b), I include the percentage of 
county residents that are African American and Hispanic. These data are yearly estimates 
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created by the California Department of Finance. Last, following research showing that 
recipients living in counties with higher caseloads are less likely to be sanctioned (Fording et 
al., 2007; Keiser et al., 2004), the analysis includes a measure of the number of TANF 
enrollees per 100,000 population with data obtained from the California Department of Social 
Services. 
 
Results 
 
Identification of local service priorities 
The results of the textual analysis identifying county service priorities are presented in 
Table 2. Thirteen codes were identified in the analysis. In general, counties make assertions 
about changing clients, changing service provision in organizations, and changing the 
communities in which the families being served are located. For instance, under the theme of 
changing clients, codes include making parents role models for their children, protecting 
children, preserving families, providing services to the whole family, and improving the well-
being of children. Codes under the theme of changing organizations are: improving 
efficiency, making services more user-friendly and easier to access, improving case 
management services, designing services to improve the career trajectories and earnings of 
recipients, and making the welfare office more like an employment agency. Last, counties 
seeking changes to the communities emphasized: improving job placement, working with the 
community to create new jobs, as well as improving the community for all residents.  
 
<< Insert Table 2 here >> 
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In the next step of the identification of service priorities, LCA was used to group 
counties with similar priorities together. To conduct the analysis, and to avoid the 
identification of local instead of global maxima, each model is run with 1,000 iterations and 
1,000 random starts. Given the fact that there are 58 counties, it is possible that the test 
statistics generated from the LCA could be biased despite the fact that the models were 
identified. To further test the groups obtained from the LCA, I also conducted the analysis 
using a hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s linkage procedure. Using this method, I 
obtain the same groups and similar item response probabilities as the LCA results. 
The model fit statistics for the four models are presented in Table 3. In table 3, a four-
class model solution is preferred by the AIC and the BIC. The Lo-Mendell-Rubin (LMR) test 
assesses whether a given model fits the data better than a model with one fewer group: in this 
analysis, the results of the LMR prefer a two-class model. The number of latent classes can 
also be assessed by examining posterior probabilities, which measure the certainty with 
which counties are assigned to classes. For the four-class solution, these statistics indicate 
that the model fits the data extremely well and that the model will classify counties into their 
respective groups 92.5 percent, 99.8 percent, 96.4 percent, and 91.5 percent of the time, 
respectively. Given the low AIC and BIC values and the strong probability statistics for the 
four-class option, I closely examined the results for this model and found them to be 
substantively meaningful. 
 
<< Insert Table 3 about here >> 
 
Description of service priorities 
The profile of each latent class in the four-class class solution is presented in Table 4. 
The table rows display the probabilities that the county plans included the listed code. The 
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last row of the table shows the percentage of counties that are placed in each class. After 
describing each group of counties, I form hypotheses about how their program goals should 
be related to sanctions and time limit exemptions. 
Service priority 1: Family and community change with well-being focus [Family 
Change]. The first group of counties identified in the LCA accounts for nearly 15 percent of 
sample counties. Overall, these counties combine a focus of helping vulnerable families with 
ensuring they receive adequate services. One of the noteworthy characteristics of counties in 
this group is their strong focus on changing families: almost half of counties say that mothers 
should learn to become role models for their children, and over one-third of counties in this 
group adopt the goal that welfare services should help preserve families, provide services for 
the entire family, and improve child well-being. Counties in this group also strongly support 
the priorities of making services more accessible (user-friendly) and providing services that 
will lead to better employment and higher earnings for recipients. This group also includes 
the highest proportion of counties (43 percent) that support the idea of working with the 
community to promote overall community well-being.  
Given the clear focus on improving child, recipient, and community well-being, while 
also the least likelihood of adopting the goal of making welfare offices function more like 
employment agencies (12 percent of counties), this group will serve as the reference for the 
following analyses. Based on the findings of Gardiner et al. (2007), since these counties do 
not adopt a strong rapid employment focus, but rather seem to focus more on building skills, 
I expect that recipients in Family Change counties will have the lowest likelihood of being 
sanctioned and be the most likely to obtain a time limit exemption.  
 
<< Insert Table 4 about here >> 
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Service priority 2: Organizational change with community job focus [Organizations 
and Jobs]. The largest group (46 percent of counties) resulting from the LCA is composed of 
counties that are likely to endorse the importance of improving the services offered by 
welfare departments, while also working with the community to place recipients in jobs and, 
to a lesser extent, increase job availability. Thus, the overall service priority of these counties 
is to improve service provision around employment for all recipients, including creating links 
to communities to increase the ability of caseworkers to help recipients find employment. 
The service priority of these counties seems similar to that of the Michigan counties seeking 
to promote employment by pro-actively placing clients into jobs (Anderson & Seefeldt, 
2003). 
In terms of organizational change, the counties in this group are likely to state that 
welfare departments should be more user-friendly (48 percent) and provide better case 
management services (41 percent of counties). In contrast to counties in the first group, these 
counties seem more work-first focused as they are much more likely to state that welfare 
departments should be restructured to function more like employment agencies (32 percent), 
while less than 5 percent of counties in this group are likely to adopt the goal of changing 
services to ensure that recipients obtain well-paying or career-focused employment. 
Compared to other groups, the counties in this group are the most likely to adopt the priorities 
of working with the community to improve job placement services for recipients (45 percent 
of counties), or to increase the availability of jobs in a community (23 percent of counties).  
Overall, the priorities of these counties seem to be narrowly focused on improving 
welfare offices themselves and improving job placement rather than promoting individual 
change. The employment focus, both through restructuring the agency to be more like an 
employment agency, as well as through its promotion of job placement, leads to the 
expectation that sanction rates may be higher and there may be fewer time limit exemptions 
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granted to recipients in Organizations and Jobs counties compared to Family Change 
counties. 
Service priority 3: Organizational change with a focus of promoting work and well-
being [Mixed]. This group comprises approximately 19 percent of California counties. These 
counties are distinguished by the fact that their service priorities are the most diffuse; they 
seem to support doing a little of everything. Their priorities include a strong focus on 
improving welfare services generally; over half of counties in this group had the stated 
priority of increasing efficiency and making services more user-friendly or easier to access. 
Additionally, all of the counties in this group stress the importance of changing services so 
that the welfare department functions more like an employment agency; however, half of 
these counties also would like to provide services to help recipients obtain jobs that will lead 
to higher earnings and future career prospects. Among priorities related to families, 47 
percent of counties stress the importance of making sure that the needs of all family members 
are met and 37 percent of counties in this group would like to improve child well-being (35 
percent). These counties also stress the importance of working with the community 
organizations to improve the community as a whole (36 percent).  
Given the multiplicity and ambiguity of priorities adopted by counties in this group, 
these counties may be crafting ambiguous plans in order to not lose political support (Davis 
& Stazyk, 2015). I do not expect recipients in Mixed counties will have meaningfully 
different outcomes than recipients in Family Change counties. 
Service priority 4: Family change with work and protection focus [Work and 
Protection]. The last class, which represents approximately 20 percent of counties, is 
characterized by counties that adopt the dual priorities of functioning more like an 
employment agency and protecting children. Thus, these counties seem to focus on the vision 
of CalWORKs described above, which is “work-first” but not “work only.” 
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As shown in Table 4, 100 percent of these counties would be expected to affirm 
promoting work by instituting changes to make welfare offices function more like 
employment agencies. In addition, 70 percent of the counties in this class affirm that their 
agency should work to protect children. Counties in this class also have the lowest probability 
of stating that welfare offices should be restructured to preserve families, be more user-
friendly, have improved case management services, increase job placement or job availability 
in the community, or to use the welfare system to promote community well-being.  
Unlike the Mixed counties, which also stressed work promotion, the stated priorities 
for Work and Protection counties are unlikely to include administrative changes such as 
increasing efficiency, making services more user-friendly, or improving case management. 
Given the strong work-promotion goals of these counties, I expect that these recipients in 
Work and Protection counties will have a higher likelihood of being sanctioned, a lower 
likelihood of being granted an exemption to time limits than recipients in Family Change 
counties. However, these hypotheses are tentative, as the child protection focus of these 
counties may translate into caseworkers being more hesitant to sanction clients and more 
likely to exempt them from time limits.  
 
Multilevel logit model results 
Table 5 shows the relationship between frontline practices, service priorities, as well as 
county-level and recipient characteristics. This table shows that, for the most part, there are 
no significant differences between frontline practices in counties that adopt different service 
priorities. However, recipients in Work and Protection counties were significantly less likely 
to be sanctioned than recipients in Family Change counties, although the likelihood of 
receiving a time limit exemption was similar.  
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In addition, very few of the county-level variables are related to client outcomes. 
Supporting the findings of other county-level research (Fording et al., 2007; Keiser et al., 
2004; Sheely, 2013), the unemployment rate of the county where the client resides is not 
associated with the likelihood of being sanctioned or being in paid employment. However, 
increases in county-level unemployment rates are related to a decreased likelihood of being 
granted a time limit exemption. The lack of relationship between the remainder of the 
variables and frontline practices is not surprising since existing research has documented an 
inconsistent relationship between sanctioning rates and the party affiliation of registered 
voters and the percent of the population that is nonwhite (Sheely, 2013). 
 
<< Insert Table 5 here >> 
 
While very few county-level variables are significantly related to the outcomes, the 
individual-level control variables largely corroborate the findings of existing research and 
follow California state policy. For example, controlling for the effects of other variables, if 
someone in their household receives disability benefits, clients are roughly 22 times as likely 
to receive a time limit exemption than families that do not receive disability income. They are 
also significantly less likely to be sanctioned. This result is consistent with California’s 
welfare law that exempts recipients with a disability from participating in work-related 
activities. Therefore, they have less of a chance of being sanctioned for noncompliance. 
Recipients with disability income are also more likely to receive a time limit exemption, 
which also corresponds to state-level regulations about time limit exemptions.  
Recipients with larger family sizes are more likely to be sanctioned than those with 
fewer children. However, they are more likely to receive a time limit exemption, possibly due 
to work requirement exemptions for recipients with young children. I also show that 
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caseworker behavior was shaped by state regulations related to recipients with educational 
barriers to employment. Based on the focus on providing recipients with basic education, one 
would expect that recipients with less then a high school degree would be less likely to be 
sanctioned and more likely to be granted a time limit exemption. These expectations are 
partly supported; after controlling for other variables in the model, recipients who had less 
than a high school education or GED were approximately two times as likely than clients 
with these educational qualifications to receive a time limit exemption. However, there were 
no significant differences in sanctioning rates. Thus, it seems that caseworkers were more 
likely to allow recipients with educational barriers to employment to stay on CalWORKs 
longer.   
Contrary to the findings of prior county-level research on the determinants of sanctions 
in other states (Fording et al., 2007; Keiser et al., 2004), being African American was not 
related to being sanctioned. However, Fording, Soss and Schram (2007) found that being 
black was only associated with an increased rate of sanctioning the longer the client was on 
TANF. At baseline, there was no relationship between these variables. In this study, African 
Americans were more likely to receive a time limit exemption. In support of other county-
level research, there is evidence that Hispanic clients are less likely to be sanctioned (Fording 
et al., 2007; Keiser et al., 2004) and I also demonstrate that they are significantly more likely 
to be granted a time limit exemption. 
 
Discussion 
One of the main justifications for devolution is that, when given control over program 
design and administration, state and local governments will use their increased discretion to 
create new and innovative programs. Overall, devolution should lead to variation in policies 
and programs that are tailored to local needs. Existing research seeking to understand the 
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effects of second-order devolution on welfare provision have either focused on documenting 
differences in the program goals and practices adopted by welfare agencies, or on the ways 
that the local economic and political environment shapes sanctioning patterns. In the current 
study, I use a novel approach that seeks to unite the strands of local-level research by both 
documenting variation in the service priorities adopted by California counties after the 
passage of welfare reform, as well as examining whether these priorities shape sanctioning 
rates and the use of time limit exemptions. Two findings seem to merit special attention. 
First, prior studies show that, in an era of devolution, welfare programs vary at both the 
state (Soss et al., 2001; Fellowes & Rowe. 2004) and local levels (Gardiner et al., 2007; 
Anderson & Seefeldt, 2000). Supporting these findings, this paper demonstrates variation in 
the service priorities adopted by California county governments. Almost half of counties in 
California were classified as Organization and Work counties, whose service priorities 
stressed the need to change welfare provision in order to make services more accessible, 
improve case management services, and better work with the community to place recipients 
in employment. This service priority seems to relate closely to the goals of the state 
CalWORKs program of promoting work, but also improving services. The other half of 
counties adopted some state priorities, but also added their own vision, which includes using 
services to change families and communities (Family Change) and ensuring that children are 
protected (Work and Protection). Supporting other research showing that organizations 
sometimes adopt goals that are ambiguous and contradictory, 19 percent of counties adopted 
Mixed service priorities that did not seem to have a clear focus, but rather aimed at changing 
families and organizations and communities. Based on these results, it does seem as though, 
as California state lawmakers intended, local governments assumed that they had the 
discretion to create their own service priorities. In their study of the implementation of 
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welfare reform among North Carolina counties, Kelleher and Yackee (2004) also found that 
managers felt they had increased authority under second-order devolution. 
Second, while I found variation in service priorities, these priorities were mostly not 
unrelated to frontline practices after controlling for other variables. I hypothesized that clients 
in Family Change counties, whose service ideology includes promoting client and 
community well-being would have the lowest rates of sanctions and the highest rates of time 
limit exemptions. Instead, results show that caseworkers in Work and Protection counties 
imposed significantly fewer sanctions than caseworkers in Family Change counties. The 
lower sanctioning rates in these counties may be due to the fact that they adopted the priority 
of protecting children, along with work promotion. Caseworkers in these counties may have 
been reluctant to impose additional financial stress on these families. Although this difference 
is significant, there appear to be very few differences in practices in counties that adopt 
different service priorities. 
Rather, individual-level variables were consistently and significantly related to whether 
or not a client was sanctioned or received a time limit exemption. Specifically, clients who 
received disability income were less likely to be sanctioned and more likely to be granted a 
time limit exemption. This finding makes sense, since recipients with disabilities are 
exempted from work participation requirements under California state law. Additionally, 
clients with low levels of education were more likely to receive a time limit exemption, 
which is in line with the human capital approach of the old CalWORKs system. Thus, this 
study lends support to prior research showing that, at the state- and local-levels, decisions are 
constrained by the policy decisions of higher levels of government (Anderson & Seefeldt, 
2000; Gardiner et al., 2007; Soss et al., 2010). Importantly, the most significant driver of 
local level variation seems to be state regulations regarding the treatment of clients. 
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It is important to note that this study adopted a novel approach to assessing local service 
priorities. Rather than conducting observations of a few welfare offices in different localities, 
I conducted a textual analysis of the priorities outlined in the welfare plans of all 58 
California counties. By doing so, I was able to systematically assess whether differences in 
service priorities were related to frontline behavior. One could argue that the groups created 
through the LCA or the county plans themselves are not meaningful and this accounts for the 
reason that they were unrelated to outcomes. However, the historical context of these plans 
shows that they were intended to reflect the priorities of counties and were explicitly crafted 
to do so. Additionally, the groups formed were consistent, regardless of whether they were 
generated through LCA or cluster analysis.  
In conclusion, this study finds that after the passage of welfare reform, California 
counties adopted a variety of service priorities for their welfare programs. However, these 
changes “on the books” were not related to changes in frontline behavior, after controlling for 
differences in client- and county-level characteristics. There are at least three potential 
explanations to this finding. First, service priorities may not be related to frontline behavior if 
the same characteristics of clients and counties that determine sanctioning and time limit 
exemptions also determined the service priorities adopted by counties. For example, counties 
with recipients with more employment barriers may adopt priorities like those found among 
Organization and Work counties. The county political context would also shape the view that 
this is the right direction to take. Therefore, once recipient and county-level characteristics 
are included, service priorities no longer matter. While it is plausible for this to be the case, 
there should be a significant bivariate association between service priorities and frontline 
practices that is reduced after including controls. In this analysis, these bivariate relationships 
are also not statistically significant (analysis not shown).  
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Second, while clear differences in program goals may exist, differences in frontline 
implementation may still be largely determined by policies and regulations set at the state and 
federal levels. As stated by Kincaid (1998, p. 23), under welfare reform, state and local 
governments “won new flexibility to design, fund, and operate welfare programs, but they 
also inherited onerous and prescriptive requirements.” For example, the ability of 
caseworkers to implement county service priorities to promote family well-being is limited 
by instructions from the federal government that clients should be encouraged to work, as 
well as state regulations setting out work requirements and exemptions. 
Third, local welfare agencies may have crafted program goals in an effort to garner 
political support. Davis and Stazyk (2015) assert that goals can be set to specify an 
organization’s expectations of its workers, including how workers will be evaluated and 
rewarded for their performance. However, the goals of organizations can also be set in order 
to garner political support from lawmakers who are responsible for setting the organization’s 
budget. As pointed out by Sosin (2012), organizations are increasingly likely to match their 
priorities and practices to those preferred by higher levels of government if they are facing a 
crisis, such as a financial shortfall. If county service priorities are created with these goals in 
mind, they would not be expected to shape worker behavior towards clients.  
Under all of these possibilities, second-order devolution has not translated into the new 
and innovative programs envisioned by lawmakers, when they passed welfare reform. Based 
on these results, one may argue that in order for devolution to have its intended effects, 
lawmakers should loosen regulations to give local governments more opportunity to truly 
create new and innovative programs. However, the regulations around giving extra protection 
to households with members with disabilities seem justified, given the vulnerability of this 
group (Parish, Rose & Andrews, 2009). For example, Parish and colleagues (2010) find that 
mothers raising children with disabilities often contend with difficulty finding employment 
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that will allow them to attend to their children’s needs, including frequent visits to health care 
providers. Therefore, some regulations seem justified. Another response to these findings is 
that one must be more cautious in setting expectations of the results that local governments 
can accomplish in a devolved welfare system that also seeks to protect vulnerable families.  
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Table 1. Variables and Data Sources 
 
Variable Data source 
Dependent variables  
Sanction 
Time limit exemption 
US Department of Health and Human 
Services, Administration for Children and 
Families 
Service priorities California Department of Social Services 
Individual characteristics  
Hispanic US Department of Health and Human 
Services, Administration for Children and 
Families 
African American 
Education  
Age 
Receives disability income 
Family size 
County characteristics  
% African American 
% Hispanic 
California Department of Finance 
% Unemployment California Economic Development 
Department 
% Registered Republican California Secretary of State 
Caseload (recipients/100,000 population) California Department of Social Services 
California Department of Finance 
Note: Service priorities assessed in 1997. All other variables include data spanning 2000 until 
2005. 
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Table 2. Codes Identified in California County Plans by Target Population and Sample Text 
 
Code Sample Text 
Focus: Children and families  
Make parents role models Help them plan for the future of their children; Participants 
will face their responsibilities to provide positive role models 
for their children; Promote healthy family life. 
 
Protect children Provide protective and supportive services to children; 
Children in an aided family should be protected by a 
community safety net; Protecting children and adults who are 
at risk of abuse or neglect. 
 
Family preservation Programs are designed that focus on family preservation; 
Requirement of both parents to support and care for their 
children; Providing services to families in need of marital 
counseling to keep both parents in the home whenever 
possible. 
 
Serve whole family Services are focused on the whole family and are based on 
family strengths; Provision of holistic family services; 
Feature a two-generational approach to welfare reform, 
focusing on both children and adults. 
 
Improve child well-being The health and well-being of children should be paramount 
in establishing work requirements for parents; To assist the 
State in reducing child poverty; Ensure that the time spent in 
child care is safe, healthy, nurturing and promotes a child's 
development and well-being 
Focus: Organizations  
Improve efficiency To develop and continually improve our system of retrieving 
relevant data; Establish specific targets, based on these 
measures, in each area of the county for achieving stated 
outcomes; Fraud will be identified and will not be tolerated. 
 
Make more user-friendly Expand efforts to reduce redundant, duplicative and overly 
complex paperwork, rules and practices in favor of 
streamlined, cost-effective and outcome-based services; 
Fuller involvement of program participants in developing 
and carrying out services; Quality customer services are to be 
provided in a fair and positive manner. 
 
Improve case management The most effective services are those tailored to the 
individual needs of a diverse participant population; Focus 
on early evaluation of barriers rather than automatic client 
placement in Job Readiness Activities; Provide 
individualized and personalized services. 
 
Make like employment 
agency 
The consistent focus being that of attainment of immediate 
employment with follow-up transitional services; Provide an 
up front employment focused service delivery to our 
customers; To promote the goal of employment in every 
related division of the agency. 
 
Use services to improve Enable clients to obtain employment that will provide a 
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career and earnings living wage and which has the capability for growth and the 
potential for increasing earnings; A substantial portion of 
employment and training resources be dedicated to assisting 
participants who are already working to secure higher-paying 
jobs which will enable them to leave the welfare system; 
Create real exits from poverty and welfare. 
Focus: Communities  
Improve job placement To develop interest and motivation in our employment 
community in providing training and job opportunities for 
our clients; Identify community networks and determine 
available job openings; Build a seamless partnership between 
job seekers, the business community and service providers. 
 
Job creation Developing the capacity of the local economy to sustain jobs 
and businesses; Create job opportunities; To support a 
diverse employment base, a range of industries will be 
developed. 
 
Improve whole community Reforming welfare must focus on creating healthy, self-
sustaining communities; To develop and encourage 
neighborhood coalitions which would promote neighbors 
helping neighbors; Develop economic opportunity strategies 
in Solano County for the overall betterment of the entire 
population. 
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Table 3. Fit Statistics for Latent Class Models 
 
 AIC BIC LMR LMR p-value Entropy 
2 classes 805.619 861.251 40.759 .0125 .925 
3 classes  796.575 881.053 36.404 .2619 .936 
4 classes 791.234 904.558 32.765 .1254 .926 
5 classes 793.3 935.47 25.486 .4709 .970 
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Table 4. Item Response Probabilities for Four-Latent-Class Model of County Service Priorities 
(N=58) 
 
Variable Family Change 
Organization and 
Work 
 
Mixed 
Work and 
Protection 
Focus: Children and families     
Role model 0.437 0.194 0 0.088 
Protect children 0 0 0.099 0.698 
Preserve family 0.343 0.173 0.156 0.146 
Serve entire family 0.343 0 0.466 0 
Increase child well-being 0.343 0.166 0.347 0.088 
Focus: Organizations     
Increase efficiency 0 0.284 1 0.284 
Make user-friendly 1 0.476 0.761 0 
Improve case management 0 0.414 0.349 0 
Promote work 0.116 0.317 1 1 
Improve career and earnings 0.904 0.046 0.592 0.108 
Focus: Community     
Collaborate with community 
to increase job placement 0.121 0.447 0.089 0 
Collaborate with community 
to increase job availability 0 0.225 0.088 0 
Increase community well-
being 0.432 0.046 0.355 0 
Proportion of counties 0.151 0.461 0.193 0.195 
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Table 5. Odds Ratios (and Standard Errors) from Multilevel Logistic Regression Results 
Assessing Relationship between Service Priorities Frontline Practices among California Counties 
 
 Sanctioned Time limit exemption 
County service priority   
Organization and Work 0.797 0.817 
(0.146) (0.113) 
Mixed  0.721 1.110 
(0.177) (0.202) 
Work and Protection 0.569 0.814 
(0.139) (0.145) 
County-level controls   
% African American 0.971 0.981 
(0.234) (0.017) 
% Latino 1.012 0.999 
(0.006) (0.005) 
% Unemployment 0.981 0.914 *** 
(0.445) (0.030) 
% Republican 0.996 1.010 
(0.011) (0.008) 
Caseload-to-population 
(per 100,000) 
1.000 1.000 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Individual-level controls   
Hispanic 0.786 ** 2.471 *** 
(0.056) (0.124) 
African American 1.067 1.128 * 
(0.085) (0.067) 
Family size 1.569 *** 1.341 *** 
 (0.095) (0.053) 
Less than high school or GED  0.962 0.455 *** 
(0.057) (0.019) 
Receives disability benefits 0.171 *** 22.614 *** 
(0.039) (2.555) 
Age 0.996 1.043 *** 
(0.003) (0.002) 
Constant 0.092 *** 0.172 *** 
(0.016) (0.022) 
County-level variance 0.124 0.075 
(0.049) (0.026) 
ICC 0.036 0.022 
 (0.014) (0.008) 
There are 58 county observations and 15,483 observations for individual-level data collected over 5 years. All 
models include year fixed effects. Coefficients displayed with standard errors in parentheses. The reference group 
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for service priorities is Family Change counties. The reference group for education is less than high school. All 
continuous variables are grand-mean centered.  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
